From: "Anders Björkman" anders.bjorkman@wanadoo.fr
To: "John Graffman" John.Graffman@VINNOVA.se
Subject: Re: E-post: WP2 1 Final Report 061010.pdf 
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2006 01:06:27 +0100
 
 
Hallo John,
members of IPE and SSPA consortia and others,
 
It was nice meeting with you last week [in Stockholm] and discuss the 
total matter. It was nice to know that you are an M.Sc. graduate from 
KTH (Royal Institute of Technology) of Naval Architecture and Marine 
Engineering with a long service in the Swedish Navy prior moving to 
VINNOVA. Thus you know what the study is all about. I was very 
surprised to hear that you still believe the visor story and that water in 
the superstructure sinks ships! It's time to refresh your basic knowledge.

Chalmers Research Study of Sinking Sequence of M/S Estonia
Safety at Sea Ltd. Study of Sinking Sequence of M/S Estonia

The consortia web site has so far not published the contributions of 
third parties with any comments. The two reports above do not refer to 
these contributions.
 
Even if it is not part of the study the consortia should study the 
available info regarding the loss of the visor and opening of the ramp 
that allegedly permitted water to flow into the superstructure causing the 
listing and later the sinking.
 
I allege that no wave or impact forces could have damaged the locks 
and removed the visor in the given weather: In model tests in regular 
waves carried out by SSPA Marin AB the wave loads will not lift the visor 
off its supports. These tests appear correct. In similar model tests but in 
irregular waves it is suggested that impact loads occur (impacts >10 
times the normal wave loads) and are recorded frequently and damage 
the locks, hinges, supports, etc. http://heiwaco.tripod.com/eapp2.htm 

I allege that the latter model tests by SSPA are falsified! Reason? The 
impacts are very short lived and caused by air/water being compressed 
locally and cannot be measured by the available test equipment. The 
local pressure may be >10 bar (full scale) but over a very small area 
and will only last some milliseconds. The only effect full scale, apart from 
a very big noise/bang, should be plastic deformation of plate panels and 
stiffeners, iwo the impact (not seen on the visor), but then the energy 
(of the impact) is lost and no forces will be transmitted to and overload 
locks and other attachments.
 
Furthermore - no impacts will occur in the given weather. Impacts only 
occur in B9 and Hs >6 meters and at much higher speeds. As soon as 
you hear the impact, you are forced to slow down. All master mariners 
working on the Finland/Estonia ferries will support the above observations. 
Thus the model tests recording impact loads are false (the local pressures 
are much smaller and cannot be scaled up correctly) ... and so are also the 
JAIC simulations to the same effects done by Karppinen & Co. There is no 
recognized method to simulate impact loads on visors above water line.
 
Thus the actual wave loads on the visor at the time of accident were 
much smaller but have been exaggerated by the JAIC suggesting they 
were impacts. 

However, when doing the strength calculations of the visor 
installation, the JAIC also falsifies those. Static (wave) loads acting aft 
and up on the visor are proposed to pull apart the locks; hinges and 
attachments in the forward direction, which is not possible. There is no 
evidence that wave loads or wave impacts removed the visor from the 
vessel!
 
The above two reports by the consortia do not refer to the only 
testimonies of the position of the ramp after the sudden listing by the 
crew in the ECR and reported by the JAIC. They suggest that the ramp 
was closed several minutes after the first listing 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt13.htm  
Thus the visor could not have fallen off and pulled open the ramp at 
that time.
 
The consortia shall carry out 'water ingress' model tests with an 
open ramp. In these tests the water flowing in will be collected in 
a tank (inside the model!) in order to be measured. However, it is 
very easy to show that the water ingress with the ramp down and 
in the given conditions (14 knots, bow waves, Hs 4.2 m, etc) the 
water ingress will be > 1 500 tons/min 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/eapp4.htm  
or double with the ramp fully down acting as a plough 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/app4.htm . It means that the vessel will 
stop and capsize within one or two minutes with > 2000 tons of 
water in the superstructure. Thus it is very important that the
consortia carry out these model water ingress tests prior to any 
further discussions what will happen then.
 
Any calculations assuming inflows abt 300 tons/min for several 
minutes with a wide open ramp are thus incorrect. With so low 
inflow it will take >5 minutes to slowly list >20°, but according to 
all information the vessel stopped within that time with the bow 
away from the waves ... and then all water accumulated on the 
car deck should flow out, when the vessel pitches and trims on 
the bow. It must also be remembered that at that time the crew 
in the ECR noted a closed ramp!
 
It is noted that in above two papers pitching due to waves and 
trim due to to free water in the superstructure and the fact that the 
vessel stops with the bow away from the waves are still ignored. 
This is completely unscientific. Any stability calculations by the 
consortia must consider that the water in the superstructure flows 
out as soon as the vessel stops.
 
If the total water inside the superstructure exceeds 2000 tons the 
vessel always turns upside down. Any calculations with 7000 tons 
of water inside the superstructure (decks 2 and 3) with the vessel 
floating stable are completely unrealistic.
 
The Rutgersson & Co paper makes reference to a suggestion that 
the 22 watertight doors were closed several minutes after the first 
listing occurred. There is no evidence to this effect. Bells or alarm 
would have been heard when these doors are closed and none 
have been reported. You are kindly referred to the Stena Nautica/
Joanna accident report published by the Swedish SHK/AIB where 
the doors were kept open and could not be closed because the 
water short circuited the controls. 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt123.htm.
 
The consortia should instead study the testimonies about the bilge 
pumps being started (prior to the listing?) and why it was done and 
about water in the engine room 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt118.htm and 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt124.htm.
 
The Rutgersson & Co paper also makes reference to a suggestion 
that 3/E Treu (the crown witness) left the ECR 10 minutes after the 
listing and escaped via a crew stairwell from the ECR to deck 8. 
The only escape from the ECR is a short vertical ladder to the car 
deck. http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt148.htm.


It is quite evident that the info given by Mr Treu cannot be true. 
Mr Hummel, member of the IPE on behalf of Meyer Werft, will no 
doubt confirm that the only escape from the ECR ends at deck 2. 
The crew normally entered the ECR from the engine room or from 
the passenger accommodation fwd on deck 1. The normal escape 
from the engine room decks 0 and 1 was also only to deck 2. 

There is a suggestion that you could climb up on vertical 
maintenance ladders through the casing  from the engine room to 
deck 8, but the ECR crew could never have  reached those ladders 
from the ECR. Easiest way to escape from the ECR was via the 
passenger stairwells forward ... but it was not possible when the 
list was >20°.
 
The Rutgersson & Co paper also makes reference to the report (4) 
by Mr Sjöling , member of the IPE, about water ingress and stability 
of the Estonia during the sinking. I would be much obliged that the 
consortia concludes that that report is 100% incorrect and based on 
incorrect assumptions (water ingress, stability, assumed water tighness 
of decks 4-8, etc). http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt151.htm . Evidently 
the deck house (decks 4-8) does not provide any buoyancy any time 
during the sinking - it is flooded immediately 100% when it becomes 
submerged.
 
The Sjöling paper makes reference to vent ducts in the side - air 
inlets in outside below deck 4 with inlets below deck 2 serving the 
engine rooms. The engine rooms were evidently ventilated via the 
casing in the centre line. Regardless - the vessel will always capsize 
and float upside down prior these small ducts (that do not exist) are 
submerged.
 
Finally - the consortia shall also explain the movement of the sinking 
vessel between the alleged position of the visor (1600 m W of the 
vreck) and the wreck itself. Evidently a sinking vessel cannot drift for 
>30 minutes with speed 2.2 knots as suggested by the JAIC - 
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/epunkt19.htm - the official plot is another 
falsification by JAIC. And there is no evidence that the visor was found 
and salvaged 1600 m W of the wreck. My simple opinion is that the 
visor was salvaged at the wreck itself.
 
With so much falsified info being published by the JAIC and still 
apparently being accepted as correct by the consortia and you, John, 
I strongly suggest that the consortia stops its work for a time and 
reflects a little! Can the SSPA consortia still believe anything 
proposed by the JAIC? Can a serious study of the sinking be based 
on all lies of the JAIC? The IPE members are kindly requested to 
propose the consortia to take 'time out' and reconsider the 
background of the whole study.
 
Kind regards,

Anders Björkman, Heiwa Co - European Agency for Safety at Sea.